A word of caution:
Please be mindful of the fact that this background guide is not intended or
expected to be the entirety of your research for the conference. It is expected to act a base and starting
point for your research. You are encouraged and expected to go through the links listed at the end of
each agenda to gain a better understanding of the topic. A better researched delegate will not only be
able to better represent his/her country but will also gain more from this conference. Due to the
technical nature of this committee, delegates are expected to cross check all facts for not only political
but also technical correctness. Please feel free to contact the Chair or Vice Chair should you have any
questions at all prior to the conference.
The IAEA
The IAEA is the world´s center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world´s
"Atoms for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its
Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear
technologies.
Apart from being the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the IAEA is at the forefront of research
and the advancement of technology in the world today. The IAEA's efforts produce coordinated
projects which span regions and continents all in the interest of applying nuclear science and
developing technologies to combat the world's problems in a practical manner.
While the IAEA is not party to either the NPT or the CTBT, it plays an important role as an impartial
body and agency that enforces both these treaties. The IAEA not only promotes the peaceful use of
nuclear technologies but also prevents their misuse. As a nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA conducts
regular inspections at nuclear facilities around the world to ensure that nuclear technology and
materials are not being mishandled, misused or trafficked illicitly.
The IAEA reconciles conflicting energy policies and coordinates fission and fusion research on
a global scale, ensuring that through intergovernmental cooperation, the results and findings of ground
breaking research are translated into practice in medicine and industries. With a looming energy crisis
and fast depleting reserves of fossil fuels, nuclear power may quite literally be our way out of darkness.
In recent years there has been much debate and controversy over the disposal of nuclear waste
but with ground breaking fusion research having taken place in recent times and an international fusion reactor in the works, the energy problem may finally be resolved.
The past decade has seen growth and development in all corners of the world. To cope with and
sustain this growth, energy is a requisite. If any endeavor is to be undertaken to allow this sustainability
the world must not only change its views on the use of nuclear energy but also ensure that nuclear
energy is not misused. In order to ensure this an international consensus is necessary and this can onlye
be achieved by the elimination of rogue nuclear programs and the abidance of nuclear treaties.
As a representative of your country in the International Atomic Energy Agency, you delegate, are charged with the immense responsibility of seeking a multilateral solution to the issues at hand.
A. Elimination of Rogue Nuclear Programs
1.Why does this fall under the purview of the IAEA?
The IAEA works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Its key roles
contribute to international peace and security, and to the World's Millennium Goals for social,
economic and environmental development.
Three main pillars - or areas of work - underpin the mission:
• Safeguards and verification
• Safety and Security
• Science and Technology
In order to ensure safety and security, the IAEA must ensure that nations, organizations and agencies
use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes only. Therefore the IAEA must actively engage in the
elimination of rogue nuclear programs.
2. What Constitutes a Rogue Nuclear Program?
For the purposes of this conference any country, agency, organization or group that unlawfully possess
nuclear materials (radioactive materials or materials of a fissile or fertile nature) and is not subject to
IAEA safeguards or party to the NPT or the CTBT will be deemed to constitute a Rogue Nuclear
Program. This definition encompasses Terrorist groups, organizations involved in the illicit trafficking
of nuclear material or technologies and nations having covert nuclear programs.
3.What can the IAEA do?
• Impose safeguard measures and conduct regular inspections
• Formulate nuclear safety plans and ensure their implementation
• Take whatever measures necessary to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials
• Negotiating and mediating situations involving Rogue Nuclear Programs
• Report suspicious activities involving nuclear technologies and materials to the United Nations
Security Council which can then take concrete measures to address such a concern.
• Use the weight of the opinion of the international community to prevent a nation or group from
engaging in non peaceful activities that involve the use of nuclear materials
This background guide will elaborate on some of the above measures that the IAEA can take. It is left
to the delegate to formulate and suggest other alternative measures that the IAEA could take to promote
non proliferation and elimination of Rogue Nuclear Programs.
4. Safeguards:
Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international
commitments not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear-weapons purposes. The global Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other treaties against the spread of nuclear weapons entrust the IAEA as
the nuclear inspectorate. Today, the IAEA safeguards nuclear material and activities under agreements
with more than 140 States.
Within the world’s nuclear non-proliferation regime, the IAEA’s safeguards system functions as a
confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other
responses by the international community if and when the need arises.
Over the past decade, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened in key areas. Measures aim to increase
the likelihood of detecting a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and to build confidence that
States are abiding by their international commitments.
What verification measures are used?
Safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of a State’s declared nuclear
material and nuclear-related activities. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and
ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets of measures are carried out in accordance with
the type of safeguards agreements in force with a State.
• One set relates to verifying State reports of declared nuclear material and activities. These
measures – authorized under NPT-type comprehensive safeguards agreements - largely are
based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance
techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities.
• Another set adds measures to strengthen the IAEA’s inspection capabilities. They include those
incorporated in what is known as an "Additional Protocol" – this is a legal document
complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. The measures enable the IAEA not only
to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State.
What kinds of inspections are done?
The IAEA carries out different types of on-site inspections and visits under comprehensive safeguards
agreements.
• Ad hoc inspections typically are made to verify a State´s initial report of nuclear material or
reports on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material involved in international transfers.
• Routine inspections - the type most frequently used - may be carried out according to a defined
schedule or they may be of an unannounced or short-notice character. The Agency´s right to
carry out routine inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements is limited to those
locations within a nuclear facility, or other locations containing nuclear material, through which
nuclear material is expected to flow (strategic points).
• Special inspections may be carried out in circumstances according to defined procedures. The
IAEA may carry out such inspections if it considers that information made available by the
State concerned, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine
inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards
agreement.
• Safeguards visits may be made to declared facilities at appropriate times during the lifecycle for
verifying the safeguards relevant design information. For example, such visits may be carried
out during construction to determine the completeness of the declared design information;
during routine facility operations and following maintenance, to confirm that no modification
was made that would allow unreported activities to take place; and during a facility
decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive equipment was rendered unusable.
5.Nuclear Plans
The Agency’s activities in nuclear security date back to the 1970s when the Agency began providing ad
hoc training courses in physical protection. However, after 11 September 2001, it became clear that
much more needed to be done to protect both nuclear and other radioactive material from malicious
acts.
In March 2002, the Agency embarked on its first comprehensive programme to combat the risk of
nuclear terrorism by assisting States in strengthening their nuclear security. Approved by the IAEA
Board of Governors, the first three-year plan described a programme of work encompassing eight
Activity Areas. The achievements of the first nuclear security plan were detailed in the Review of the
Implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan of Activities: 2002–2005 which was submitted to the
Board of Governors and General Conference in September 2005.
Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 is currently in effect
In September 2005, the Board of Governors approved a new Nuclear Security Plan covering the period
2006–2009. The new Plan builds upon the accomplishments of the first Plan, reviews the threat picture
as it has evolved since the configuration of the priorities and approach set in 2002, and promotes
strengthened international instruments to combat nuclear terrorism.
The Nuclear Security Plan 2006–2009 covers three activity areas:
• Needs assessment, analysis and coordination
• Prevention
• Detection and response
Specifically, the new Plan prioritizes:
• providing advice concerning the implementation of binding and non-binding international
instruments;
• development of guidance and documents;
• review and assessment of needs;
• providing support to States for the implementation of nuclear security recommendations; and
• outreach and information exchange through databases, conferences, workshops and fellowships.
Activities originally conceived for safeguards, and nuclear and radiation safety purposes, but which
also support nuclear security objectives, are also covered in the Plan.
Furthermore The Agency has taken steps towards consolidating States' nuclear security needs into
integrated plans for nuclear security improvements and assistance. The Agency drafts, in consultation
with the hosting State, the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), which is tailored to the
State's specific needs on the basis of findings and recommendations from the Agency's range of nuclear
security missions (INSServ, IPPAS, ITE , ISSAS, RASSIA) and supported and supplemented by other
Agency information.
6.Prevention of Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials
Established in 1995, the ITDB is the IAEA´s information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and
other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and radioactive materials. The ITDB is a
unique asset helping participating States and selected international organizations in combating illicit
nuclear trafficking and strengthening nuclear security. It is also an essential component of the
information platform supporting the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan.
The ITDB facilitates the exchange of authoritative information on incidents among States. As of 1
September 2009, 107 States participate in the ITDB Programme. In some cases, non-participating
Member States have provided information to the ITDB.
The scope of the ITDB information is broad. It includes, but is not limited to, incidents involving
illegal trade and movement of materials across borders. The scope covers incidents involving
unauthorized acquisition (e.g. through theft), supply, possession, use, transfer or disposal of nuclear and
other radioactive materials, whether intentionally or unintentionally, with or without crossing
international borders. The scope also covers unsuccessful or thwarted acts of the above type, the loss of
materials and the discovery of uncontrolled materials.
It is recognized that many States lack the necessary technical capabilities to detect unauthorized
movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Through nuclear security and technical
cooperation programs, the Agency provides States, to a limited extent, with equipment for detection of
smuggling of radioactive substances at borders. The IAEA also facilitates provision of such equipment
through the bilateral support programs.
7.Current Situation
Under the terms of the NPT, which went into effect in 1970, only five countries were allowed to have
nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers at that time :the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France,
and China,agreed not to proliferate weapons technology to other countries and to work toward their own eventual nuclear disarmament.
Some 190 countries ratified the treaty. But 36 years later, the world faces a problem. There are now
nine nuclear weapon states, four of them outside the NPT. Several other countries that have civilian
nuclear programs have the capabilities to develop military nuclear programs simply by channeling
existing civilian nuclear technology. Fortunately most of the nations with civilian nuclear programs are
stable democracies and have not expressed any desire to use nuclear technology for defense purposes.
However the situation with the middle eastern countries and DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of
Korea) continues to remain unresolved.
IAEA and DPRK:
IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities removed safeguards equipment and left the country
on 16 April 2009, following the DPRK decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA. The
international community needs the assistance and guidance of the IAEA to address this situation.
IAEA and Iran:
Iran continues to argue that it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the
generation of power in the face of looming energy crisis. Segments of the international community
however continue to doubt Iran's motives and this was reflected in the recently passed resolution
“Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
This resolution was adopted by the IAEA board of governors on the 27th of November 2009. This
resolution can be found on the IAEA website and delegates are recommended and encouraged to read
both it and Iran's response which can be found alongside.
Illicit Trafficking of nuclear material:
From January 1993 to December 2008, a total of 336 incidents involving unauthorized possession and
related criminal activities were confirmed to the ITDB. Incidents included in this category involve
illegal possession, movement, or attempts to illegally trade in or use nuclear materials or radioactive
sources. Fifteen incidents in this category involved high enriched uranium (HEU) and Plutonium.
In addition, 421 reported incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials
and 724 cases involved other unauthorized activities, such as the unauthorized disposal of radioactive
materials or discovery of "orphan sources". In the remaining 81 cases the reported information was not
sufficient to determine the category of incident.
Information reported to the ITDB shows a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and
other radioactive materials, thefts, losses, and other unauthorized activities.
USA has taken a lead in ensuring the nuclear materials globally are safeguarded. The two organizations
listed below have also played a significant role.
• Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR): The CTR program provides funding to help Russia
secure materials that might be used in nuclear or chemical weapons as well as to dismantle
weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in Russia.
• Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI): Expanding on the success of the CTR, the GTRI
will expand nuclear weapons and material securing and dismantlement activities to states
outside of the former Soviet Union.
8. Questions to Consider:
Delegates are requested to keep the following things in mind while doing their research and writing
position papers:
• What, according to your nation, constitutes a rogue nuclear program?
• Does your nation have a civilian or military nuclear program?
• If your nation has a civilian military program, do your research reactors and power plants
comply with IAEA safeguards? Are they subject to routing inspections?
• Does your country deem the inspection of its nuclear facilities as a violation of its sovereignty?
• Has your nation ever been faced by the problem of nuclear terrorism and if yes, what measures
were taken to avert such a threat?
• What, in your opinion can the IAEA do to eliminate nuclear programs?
• Does your nation believe that it is the unalienable right of every nation to have a civilian
nuclear program?
• Has your country benefitted from an INSSP?
• Has your nation signed and ratified the CTBT and NPT. If not, why?
• Does your nation deem the threat from rogue nuclear programs to be immediate and worth
addressing? If not, why?
• Has your country in any way assisted the IAEA in securing this threat? If yes, in what manner?
• What diplomatic relations does your country have with Iran and DPRK?
• What are your country's views on nuclear disarmament and non proliferation.
B. The Future of Nuclear Technology and Missile Defence
Our world is changing rapidly.
As the nation’s progress greatly with the passing of years and more and more fossil fuels (non-renewable resources) are utilised in excess, being scarce resources, the world has reached a point wherein we face a ‘do or die’ situation. Our resources are depleting at a fast pace and the IAEA, with its Atoms for Peace policy is in direct relevance to the challenges so faced, at par with safe, renewable technology. We have been charged with sharing the benefits of nuclear technology with all countries and peoples, while preventing the misuse of this technology for destructive ends.
We are turning our vision to the future. What can we predict? How can we prepare - with effective policies, strategic partnerships, and focused research - for the changes we expect?
- Nuclear Power
Even the most conservative estimates predict at least a doubling of energy usage by mid-century. Coupled with concerns related to the risk of climate change and the security of energy supply, this anticipated growth in energy demand is leading to predictions of a greater role for nuclear power.
Innovation will play a key role in determining the extent to which nuclear energy will meet future energy needs. Advanced fuel cycles are already being developed with the aim of better energy utilization of uranium, plutonium and other actinides; developing small reactors that meet the needs of developing countries; and with built in enhanced features for safety, security, waste minimization and proliferation resistance. The Agency´s International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) is currently considering collaborative projects that would address some of these innovation needs. A key measure of success in this area will be how well our policy and technology innovations are designed to serve all would-be users of nuclear power. Hopefully, a multilateral mechanism for the management and control of the back end of the fuel cycle will brought forward. But this is clearly is also an important component of planning for the future of nuclear power.
Looking further ahead: there is no denying that nuclear fusion promises an array of positive characteristics: an inexhaustible source of energy; inherent safety; and few negative environmental implications.
- Food, Agriculture and Health
Food & Agriculture
The IAEA has been collaborating with the FAO(Food and Agricultural Organization) and the efforts undertaken by the collaboration are as follows :
• overcoming hunger and malnutrition;
• agriculture as a contributor to economic and social development; and
• sustainable management of land, water, and other natural resources.
New developments in promising areas such as biotechnology, gene sequencing and nanotechnology, are anticipated to have a significant impact in the coming years on food and agriculture production. These initiatives will also generate benefits in human and animal health and land and water resource management. Nuclear applications stand to make key contributions to meeting these goals.
Health
The incidence of cancer is rising quickly. Over the next 25 years, the majority of new cases and deaths will occur in low and middle income countries - in part because of population growth and greater longevity. A major challenge for many of these countries will be finding the sufficient funds to address these trends. Effective prevention can reduce the risk of cancer. Effective screening and early detection can lead to treatments and cures in many cases. But for too many developing countries, no such modalities are in place.
The IAEA technical cooperation (TC) programme already dedicates 28.6% of its total budget to projects focused on human health. There are currently over 100 TC projects related to radiotherapy in 70 Member States.
The Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) aims to place cancer front and centre on the global health agenda. Strong working relationships have been developed with the World Health Organization and other key agencies such as the International Network for Cancer Treatment and Research and the International Agency for Research on Cancer and talks are underway to setup various fund raising activities as well as cancer treatment camps worldwide, so the treatment of the incurable disease finds its roots more widespread within the earthen community.
- Safety and Security: Building Robust Regimes
As a highly sophisticated technology, nuclear power plants require a correspondingly sophisticated safety and security infrastructure, well beyond that needed for other nuclear applications.
There continues to be a clear need to build up and maintain a global safety and security regime - a regime supported by international instruments, the application of IAEA standards and guidelines, national safety and security infrastructures and an active global network for knowledge sharing.
The IAEA now offers an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), which combined previous services ranging from nuclear safety and radiation safety to emergency preparedness and nuclear security. The IRRS is contributing towards a more active exchange of knowledge among senior regulators and more harmonized regulatory approaches worldwide.
- Nuclear Verification: The Long-Term View, The future of Nuclear Missile defence
During the last decade, safeguards experienced a remarkable transformation. It evolved from a verification system focused on declared nuclear material at declared nuclear facilities to a much more comprehensive, information driven system, able to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States as a whole.
The strengthening of safeguards in the early 1990s introduced new methods and techniques: for example, remote monitoring or environmental sampling. The Additional Protocol extended the legal framework and provided the Agency with access to additional information and locations.
Objectives of the Agency would be to strengthen the enforcement of Nuclear Programmes such as the NPT, and the CTBT on the signatories, and ensure that some sort of agreement is reached with the non-signatories of these programmes to curb their questionable production of unnecessary nuclear war heads. The world has reached a point wherein war has become a complete evil, and after the fiasco that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, the time has come to stop our futile attempts at creating greater nuclear emergencies and concentrate on the larger emerging goal- World peace.
As we look to the future, the Agency’s acute verification role could evolve and expand in many aspects. An expansion in use of nuclear power could greatly increase the necessary size of the programme. The recreation of nuclear disarmament efforts could significantly add to the responsibility. But in addition, the United body will need to constantly be on the alert for the re-emergence of clandestine nuclear procurement networks. The requirement for sophisticated approaches for information analysis has arisen and we must plan more strategically for the continual updates to equipment and expertise.
Questions to answer
1) What are the policies being implemented and to be implemented by your country in regard to nuclear technology?
2) Does your country have any strategic partnerships established with other countries – is yes, elaborate.
3) What are the various aspects of the Research and Development carried out by your country? – Are you a participant in INPRO( Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel cycles)
4) What is the nuclear technology already possessed by your country, and what technology advancements does your nation intend on procuring?
5) Food, Health and Agriculture – Has your country implemented nuclear technology usage? Does it intend to in the future?
6) The use of nuclear technology comes with a lot of security connotations – State the safety measures implemented by your country?
7) Is your country a signatory of the CTBT and NPT?
What are your countries views on the future of nuclear missile defence?
8) Does your country have any future plans with relevance to nuclear technology?
